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Abstract—The emerging federated cloud paradigm advocates
sharing of resources among cloud providers, to exploit temporal
availability of resources and diversity of operational costs for job
serving. While extensive studies exist on enabling interoperability
across different cloud platforms, a fundamental question on cloud
economics remains unanswered: When and how should a cloud
trade VMs with others, such that its net proﬁt is maximized over
the long run? In order to answer this question by the federation,
a number of important, correlated decisions, including job
scheduling, server provisioning and resource pricing, need to
be dynamically made, with long-term proﬁt optimality being a
goal. In this work, we design efﬁcient algorithms for inter-cloud
resource trading and scheduling in a federation of geo-distributed
clouds. For VM trading among clouds, we apply a double auction-
based mechanism that is strategyproof, individual rational, and
ex-post budget balanced. Coupling with the auction mechanism is
an efﬁcient, dynamic resource trading and scheduling algorithm,
which carefully decides the true valuations of VMs in the auction,
optimally schedules stochastic job arrivals with different SLAs
onto the VMs, and judiciously turns on and off servers based
on the current electricity prices. Through rigorous analysis, we
show that each individual cloud, by carrying out our dynamic
algorithm, can achieve a time-averaged proﬁt arbitrarily close to
the ofﬂine optimum.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emerging federated cloud paradigm advocates sharing
of disparate cloud services (in separate data centers) from
different cloud providers, and interconnecting them based on
common standards and policies to provide a universal environ-
ment for cloud computing. Such a cloud federation exploits
temporal and spatial availability of resources (e.g., virtual
machines) and diversity of operational costs (e.g., electricity
prices): when a cloud experiences a burst of incoming jobs, it
may resort to VMs of other clouds having idle resources; when
the electricity price for running servers and VMs is high at one
data center, the cloud can schedule jobs onto other data centers
with lower electricity charges. In this way, the aggregate job
processing capacity of the cloud federation can potentially be
higher than the summation of the capacities of separate clouds
operating alone, leading possibly to a larger overall proﬁt.
To realize such a federated cloud paradigm, fundamental
problems on cloud economics need to be resolved. Naturally,
a cloud in the real world is selﬁsh, and would try every mean
to maximize its own proﬁt—i.e., its income from handling jobs
and leasing VMs to other clouds, minus its operational costs
and expenses in VM rental from other clouds. Only if its proﬁt
can be maximized and in any case not lower than when operat-
ing alone, can a cloud be incentivized to join a federation. This
incentive is materialized if an efﬁcient mechanism to carry out
resource trading and scheduling among federated clouds, thus
achieving proﬁt maximization for individual clouds, can be put
in place. To this end, several correlated, practical decisions
need to be made: (1) VM pricing: what mechanism should
be advocated for VM sale and purchase among the clouds,
and at what prices? (2) Job scheduling: given time-varying
job arrivals at each cloud, having different resource and SLA
requirements, should a cloud serve the jobs right away or later,
and use its own resources or others’, in order to take advantage
of lower electricity prices? (3) Server provisioning: is it more
beneﬁcial for a cloud to keep many of its servers running to
serve jobs of its own and those from others, or to switch some
of them off to save electricity costs? These decisions should be
efﬁciently and optimally made in an online fashion, which in
turn provide a guarantee for long-term optimality of individual
cloud’s proﬁts.
In this paper, we design efﬁcient algorithms for inter-cloud
resource trading and scheduling, in a federation consisting of
disparate cloud data centers. A double auction-based mecha-
nism is applied for the sell and purchase of available VMs
across cloud boundaries, which is strategy-proof, individual
rational, and ex-post budget balanced. Closely combined with
the auction mechanism is an efﬁcient, dynamic VM trading
and scheduling algorithm, which carefully decides the true
valuations of VMs to participate in the auction, optimally
schedules randomly-arriving jobs with different resource re-
quirements (e.g., number of VMs) and SLAs (e.g., maximum
job scheduling delay) onto different data centers, and judi-
ciously turns on and off servers in the clouds based on the
current electricity prices. The contributions of this work are
summarized as follows.
First, we address selﬁshness of individual clouds in a cloud
federation, and design efﬁcient mechanisms to maximize the
net proﬁt of each participating cloud. This proﬁt is not only
guaranteed to be larger than that when the cloud operates
alone, but also maximized over the long run, in the presence
of time-varying job arrivals and electricity prices.
Second, we novelly combine a truthful double auction
mechanism with stochastic Lyapunov optimization techniques,
and design an online VM trading and scheduling algorithm for
a cloud to optimally price the VMs and judiciously schedule
the VM and server usages. Each cloud values different VMs
based on the back pressure in its job queues, and bids for them
in the auction for effective VM acquisition.
Third, we demonstrate that by applying the dynamic algo-
rithm with double auction, each cloud can achieve a time-
averaged proﬁt arbitrarily close to its ofﬂine optimum (ob-
tained if the cloud has complete knowledge of the incoming
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jobs and electricity prices over the entire time span).
In the rest of the paper, we discuss related literature in
Sec. II, present the system model in Sec. III, introduce
the detailed resource trading and scheduling mechanisms in
Sec. IV, and conclude the paper in Sec. V.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Optimal Scheduling in Cloud Computing
Existing literature ([1]–[3] and references therein) on re-
source scheduling in cloud systems focuses mainly on a single
cloud that operates alone. A common theme is to minimize the
operational costs (mainly consisting of electricity bills) in one
or multiple data centers of the cloud, while providing certain
performance guarantee for job scheduling, e.g., in terms of
average job completion times [1]–[3]. Different from these
studies, this work investigates bounded scheduling delay for
each job even in the worst cases, and proﬁt maximization for
individual selﬁsh clouds in a cloud federation.
B. Resource Trading Mechanisms
There is a large body of literature devoting to resource trad-
ing in computing grids [4] and wireless spectrum leasing [5]
[6]. Various mechanisms have been studied, e.g., bargaining
[4], ﬁxed or dynamic pricing based on a contract or the supply-
demand ratio [7], and auctions [5], [6].
A typical bargaining mechanism [4] tends to have unaccept-
able complexity when negotiating between each pair of traders.
Fixed pricing, e.g., Amazon EC2 on-demand instances, has
been shown to be inefﬁcient in proﬁt maximization given there
are system dynamics [8]. Dynamic pricing, such as Amazon
EC2 spot instances, could be inefﬁcient too, as the participants
may quote the resources untruthfully [9].
Auction stands out as a promising mechanism, for which
there are many solutions ([5], [6] and references therein) with
truthful design and polynomial complexity. Although some
recent works [8], [9] aim to design an auction mechanism with
individual rationality (non-negative proﬁt gain) for trading in
federated clouds, they do not explicitly address individual
proﬁt maximization over the long run. Moreover, there is very
little discussion in the literature on auctions about methods to
quantitatively calculate the true valuation in each bid, which is
usually assumed as known. Our design addresses these issues.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND AUCTION FRAMEWORK
A. Federation of Clouds
We consider a federation of F clouds, each of which
assigned to a different geometric location and operates au-
tonomously to gain proﬁt by serving its customers’ job re-
quests, managing server provisioning and trading resources
with other clouds.
Service demands: Each individual cloud i ∈ [1, F ] has a
front-end proxy server, which accepts job requests from its
customers. There are S types of jobs being serviced at each
cloud, each speciﬁed by a three-tuple < ms, gs, ds >. Here,
ms ∈ [1,M ] refers to the type of the required VM instances,
where M is the maximum number of VM types, and each
type corresponds to a different set of conﬁgurations of CPU,
storage and memory; gs is the number of type-ms VMs that
the job needs simultaneously (see Amazon EC2 API [7]);
and ds stands for the SLA (Service Level Agreement) of job
type s ∈ [1, S], evaluated by the maximal response delay
for scheduling a job, i.e., the time-span from when the job
arrives to when it starts to run on the scheduled VMs. In a real
cloud, it is common to buy servers of the same conﬁguration
and provision the same type of VMs on one machine [10].
Therefore, we suppose each cloud i has Nmi homogeneous
servers to provision VMs of type m ∈ [1,M ], each of which
can provide a maximum of Cmi VMs of this type; the total
number of servers in cloud i is
∑M
m=1N
m
i .
The system runs in a time-slotted fashion. At the beginning
of each time slot t, rsi (t) ∈ [0, Rsi ] jobs arrive at cloud i, for
each job type s. Rsi is an upper-bound on the number of type-s
jobs submitted to cloud i in a time slot. The arrival of jobs is
an ergodic process at each cloud. We assume the arrival rate
is given, and how a customer decides which cloud to use is
not a concern in this study. Let psi (t) ∈ [0, p
s(max)
i ] be the
given service charge to the customer by cloud i, for accepting
a job of type s in time slot t, which remains ﬁxed within a
time slot, but may vary across time slots. Here, ps(max)i is the
maximum possible price for psi (t).
Job scheduling: Each incoming job to cloud i enters a FIFO
queue of its type—a cloud i maintains a queue to buffer
unscheduled jobs of each type s, with Qsi (t) as its length in t.
When the required VMs of a job are allocated, the job departs
from its queue and starts to run on the VMs. A cloud may
schedule its jobs on either its own VMs or VMs leased from
other clouds, whichever yields the best economic beneﬁts.
Let μsij(t) be the number of type-s jobs of cloud i that are
scheduled for processing in cloud j at the beginning of slot t.
When a job’s maximum response time (the SLA) cannot
be met, probably because of system overload, the job is
dropped. A penalty is raised in this case, to compensate for
the customer’s loss. Let
Dsi (t) ∈ [0, D
s(max)
i ] (1)
be the number of type-s jobs dropped by cloud i in t, where
D
s(max)
i is the maximum value of Dsi (t). Let ξsi ≥ p
s(max)
i
be the penalty to drop one such job, which is at least equal to
the maximum price charged to the customer if the job were
accepted.
Hence, the number of unscheduled jobs buffered at each
cloud can be updated with the following the queueing law:
Qsi (t+ 1) =max{Q
s
i (t)−
F∑
j=1
μsij(t)−D
s
i (t), 0}
+ rsi (t), ∀s ∈ [1, S], ∀i ∈ [1, F ]. (2)
Job scheduling should satisfy the following SLA constraint:
Each type-s job in cloud i is either scheduled or dropped (subject
to a penalty) before its maximum response delay ds, ∀s ∈ [1, S].
(3)
To satisfy this SLA constraint, we seek to bound the lengths
of job queues and the following virtual queues Zsi , each
associated with a job queue Qsi . The virtual queues are created
based on the −persistence queue technique [11].
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Zsi (t+ 1) = max{Z
s
i (t) + 1{Qsi (t)>0} · [s −
F∑
j=1
μsij(t)]−D
s
i (t)
− 1{Qs
i
(t)=0} ·
F∑
j=1
Cmsj ·N
ms
j
gs
, 0}, ∀i ∈ [1, F ], s ∈ [1, S]. (4)
Here, s > 0 is a constant. 1{Qs
i
(t)>0} and 1{Qs
i
(t)=0} are
indicator functions such that
1{Qs
i
(t)>0} =
{
1 if Qsi (t) > 0
0 Otherwise ; 1{Q
s
i
(t)=0} =
{
1 if Qsi (t) = 0
0 Otherwise .
Length of a virtual queue reﬂects the cumulated response delay
of jobs from the respective job queue.
Server provisioning: We consider the electricity cost, for
running and cooling the servers [12], as the main component
of the operational cost in a cloud. Other costs, e.g., space
rental and labour, remain relatively ﬁxed for a long time, and
therefore are of less interest. Given that electricity prices vary
at different locations and from time to time [1], we model
the operational cost βi(t) in each cloud i as a general ergodic
process over time, varying across time slots between β(min)i
and β(max)i .
Each cloud strategically decides the number of active
servers at each time, to optimize its proﬁt. Let nmi (t) be the
number of active servers provisioning type-m VMs at cloud i
in t. The available server capacities constrain any feasible job
scheduling strategy at time t as follows:∑
j∈[1,F ]
∑
s:ms=m,s∈[1,S]
gsμ
s
ji(t) ≤ C
m
i · n
m
i (t),
∀m ∈ [1,M ], ∀i ∈ [1, F ], (5)
nmi (t) ≤ N
m
i , ∀m ∈ [1,M ], ∀i ∈ [1, F ]. (6)
(5) states that the overall demand for type-m VMs in cloud
i from itself and other clouds should be no larger than the
maximum number of available type-m VMs on the active
servers in cloud i. Here gsμsji(t) is the total number of VMs
needed by type-s jobs scheduled from cloud j to cloud i
in t. Considering practical job execution efﬁciency, we only
consider the scheduling of a job to VMs in a single cloud,
but not to VMs across different clouds. (6) ensures that the
number of active servers is limited by the total number of
on-premise servers of the corresponding VM conﬁguration at
each cloud.
B. Inter-cloud VM Trading with Double Auction
In an inter-cloud resource market, VMs are the items for
trading. For each type of VMs, multiple clouds may have
them on sale while multiple other clouds can request them.
A double auction is a natural ﬁt to implement efﬁcient trading
in this case, allowing both selling and buying clouds to actively
participate in pricing to strive for their own beneﬁts. In our
dynamic system, a multi-unit double auction is carried out
among the clouds at the beginning of each time slot, to decide
the VM trades within that time slot.
Buyers & Sellers: A cloud can be both a buyer and a seller.
A buy-bid < bmi (t), γmi (t) > records the unit price and
maximum quantity for which cloud i is willing to buy VMs of
type m, in t. Similarly, a sell-bid < smi (t), ηmi (t) > records
the unit price and maximum quantity for which cloud i is
willing to sell VMs of type m in t.
Let b˜mi (t) and s˜mi (t) be cloud i’s true valuations of buying
and selling a type-m VM respectively (the max/min price it is
willing to pay/accept). Similarly, let γ˜mi (t) and η˜mi (t) be cloud
i’s true valuations of the quantities to buy and sell VMs of type
m respectively (the maximum number of VMs it is willing to
purchase/sell). A cloud i may strategically manipulate the bid
prices and volumes, in the hope of maximizing its proﬁt.
Auctioneer: We assume that there is a broker in the cloud
federation, assuming the role of the auctioneer. After collecting
all the buy and sell bids, the auctioneer executes a double
auction to decide the set of successful buy and sell bids, their
clearing prices and the numbers of VMs to trade in each
type. Let bˆmi (t) be the actual charge price for cloud i to buy
one type-m VM, and γˆmi (t) be the actual number of VMs
purchased. Similarly, let sˆmi (t) be the actual income cloud i
receives for selling one type-m VM, and ηˆmi (t) be the actual
number of VMs sold.
Let αmij (t) be the number of type-m VMs that cloud i
purchases from cloud j in t, as decided by the auctioneer:
γˆmi (t) =
∑
j∈[1,F ],j =i
αmij (t), ∀m ∈ [1,M ], i ∈ [1, F ], (7)
ηˆmi (t) =
∑
j∈[1,F ],j =i
αmji(t), ∀m ∈ [1,M ], i ∈ [1, F ]. (8)
Since VMs are purchased for serving jobs, the job schedul-
ing decisions μsij(t) at each cloud i, ∀j ∈ [1, F ], s ∈ [1, S],
are related to the number of VMs it purchases:∑
s:s∈[1,S],ms=m
gs·μ
s
ij(t) = α
m
ij (t),
∀m ∈ [1,M ],∀i, j ∈ [1, F ], i = j. (9)
Three economic properties are desirable for the auctioneer’s
mechanism. (i) Truthfulness: Bidding true valuations is a
dominant strategy, and consequently, both bidder strategies
and auction design are simpliﬁed. (ii) Individual Rationality:
Each cloud obtains a non-negative proﬁt by participating in
the auction. (iii) Ex-post Budget Balance: The auctioneer has
a non-negative surplus, i.e., the total payment from all winning
buy-bids is no less than the total charge for all winning sell-
bids in each time slot. Detailed design of an auction with these
properties is given in our technical report [13].
C. Individual Selﬁshness
Each cloud in the federation aims to maximize its time-
averaged proﬁt (revenue minus cost) over the long run of
the system, while striving to fulﬁl the resource and SLA
requirements of each job.
Revenue: A cloud has two sources of revenue: i) job service
charges paid by its customers, and ii) the proceeds from VM
sales. The time-averaged revenue of cloud i by undertaking
different types of jobs from its customers is
Φi1 = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
s∈[1,S]
E{psi (t) · r
s
i (t)}, ∀i ∈ [1, F ]. (10)
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We assume the front-end charges, psi (t), from a cloud to its
customers, are given. Hence, this part of the revenue is ﬁxed
in each time slot. The time-averaged income of cloud i from
selling VMs to other clouds is:
Φi2 = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
m∈[1,M]
E{sˆmi (t) · ηˆ
m
i (t)}, ∀i ∈ [1, F ]. (11)
Cloud i can control this income by adjusting its sell-bids, i.e.,
smi (t) and ηmi (t), ∀m ∈ [1,M ], at each time.
Cost: The cost of cloud i consists of three parts: i) operational
costs incurred for running its active servers, ii) the penalties for
dropping jobs, and iii) the expenditure on buying VMs from
other clouds. The time-averaged cost for operating servers is
decided by the number of active servers in each time, i.e.,
Ψi1 = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E{βi(t) ·
M∑
m=1
nmi (t)}, ∀i ∈ [1, F ]. (12)
The time-averaged penalty is determined by the number of
dropped jobs over time, i.e., Dsi (t), ∀s ∈ [1, S], t ∈ [0, T−1]:
Ψi2 = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
s∈[1,S]
E{ξsi ·D
s
i (t)}, ∀i ∈ [1, F ]. (13)
The time-averaged expenditure for VM purchase is decided
by the actual VM trading prices and numbers, as decided by
the buy-bids (bmi (t), γmi (t)) from cloud i:
Ψi3 = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E{
M∑
m=1
bˆmi (t) · γˆ
m
i (t)}. (14)
Proﬁt Maximization: The proﬁt maximization problem at
cloud i ∈ [1, F ] can be formulated as follows:
max Φi1 +Φ
i
2 −Ψ
i
1 −Ψ
i
2 −Ψ
i
3 (15)
s.t. Constraints (1)-(9).
IV. DYNAMIC ALGORITHMS
We next present a dynamic algorithm for each cloud to trade
VMs and schedule jobs/servers, which is in fact applicable
under any truthful, individual-rational and ex-post budget
balanced double auction mechanism. Fig. 1 illustrates the
relation among these algorithm modules.
Fig. 1. Key algorithm modules.
The goal of the dynamic algorithm at each cloud i is to
maximize its time-averaged proﬁt, i.e., to solve optimization
(15), by dynamically making decisions in each time slot. We
apply the drift-plus-penalty framework in Lyapunov optimiza-
tion theory [14], and derive (from (15)) the following one-shot
optimization problem to be solved by cloud i in each time slot
t (detailed derivation in our technical report [13]):
max ϕi1(t) + ϕ
i
2(t) + ϕ
i
3(t) (16)
s.t. Constraints (1), (5)-(9).
where
ϕi1(t) = V
∑
m∈[1,M]
[sˆmi (t)ηˆ
m
i (t)− bˆ
m
i (t)γˆ
m
i (t)− βi(t)n
m
i (t)],
ϕi2(t) =
∑
s=∈[1,S]
∑
j∈[1,F ]
μsij(t)[Q
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)],
ϕi3(t) =
∑
s∈[1,S]
Dsi (t)[Q
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t)− V · ξ
s
i ],
and V > 0 is a user-deﬁned parameter for gauging the
optimality of the time-averaged proﬁt.
In solving the one-shot optimization, cloud i observes the
states of job and virtual queues (Qi(s)(t), Zsi (t)), job arrival
rates, the current cost for server operation (βi(t)), and then
decides the optimal values of variables for optimal decisions
on i) buy/sell bids for different types of VMs, ii) scheduling of
active servers and jobs to these servers, and iii) jobs to drop.
1. VM Valuation and Bid: Optimization (16) is related to the
actual charges bˆmi (t) and sˆmi (t) (∀m ∈ [1,M ]) and traded VM
numbers γˆmi (t) and ηˆmi (t) (∀m ∈ [1,M ]), from the double
auction. These values are determined by the auctioneer accord-
ing to buy-bids (bmi (t), γmi (t)) and sell-bids (smi (t), ηmi (t))
submitted by all clouds, and its double auction mechanism.
When a truthful double auction is employed, sellers and
buyers bid their true values of the prices and quantities, in
order to maximize their individual utilities. (16) is the utility
maximization problem for each cloud. If we can ﬁnd true
values of each cloud i, b˜mi (t), γ˜mi (t), s˜mi (t) and η˜mi (t), and
let the cloud bid using these values, the achieved proﬁt in (16)
is guaranteed to be the largest, as compared to bidding other
values.
The true values of the buy/sell prices for cloud i are derived
as follows (detailed derivation is presented in the technical
report [13]):
b˜mi (t) =
Q
s∗m
i (t) + Z
s∗m
i (t)
V · gs∗m
, (17)
and
s˜mi (t) =
⎧⎨
⎩
Q
s∗m
i
(t)+Z
s∗m
i
(t)
V ·gs∗m
if Q
s∗m
i
(t)+Z
s∗m
i
(t)
V ·gs∗m
> βi(t)/C
m
i
βi(t)/C
m
i Otherwise
,
(18)
respectively, where
s∗m = arg max
s′∈[1,S],ms′=m
{W s
′
i (t)}, (19)
and W s
′
i (t) =
Qs
′
i (t) + Z
s′
i (t)
gs′
. (20)
W s
′
i (t) denotes the weight for scheduling one type-s′ job (to
run on type-ms′ VM(s)) by cloud i in t, and s∗m speciﬁes
the job type with the largest weight (ties broken arbitrarily),
among all types of jobs requiring type-m VMs.
The true values of the number of type-m VMs to buy and
to sell at cloud i are
γ˜mi (t) =
∑
j∈[1,F ]
Cmi ·N
m
i , (21)
and η˜mi (t) = Cmi ·Nmi . (22)
They state that the maximum number of type-m VMs cloud
i is willing to buy (sell) at the price in (17) (in (18)), is the
number of all potential type-m VMs in the federation (the
number i can provision).
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Algorithm 1 Dynamic Proﬁt Maximization Algorithm at cloud
i in Time Slot t
Input: rsi (t), Qsi (t), Zsi (t), gs, ms, ξsi , Cmi , Nmi and βi(t), ∀s ∈
[1, S].
Output: bmi (t), smi (t), γmi (t), ηmi (t), Dsi (t), μsij(t) and nmi (t),
∀m ∈ [1,M ], s ∈ [1, S], j ∈ [1, F ].
1: VM valuation and bid: Decide bmi (t), smi (t), γmi (t) and ηmi (t)
with Eqn. (17)-(22);
2: Server provisioning, job scheduling and dropping: Decide
μsij(t), D
s
i (t) and nmi (t) with Eqn. (23), (25) and (26);
3: Update Qsi (t) and Zsi (t) with Eqn. (2) and (4).
To conclude, in each time slot t, cloud i submits its bids as
bmi (t) = b˜
m
i (t), s
m
i (t) = s˜
m
i (t), γ
m
i (t) = γ˜
m
i (t) and ηmi (t) =
η˜mi (t), for each type of VMs m ∈ [1,M ].
2. Server Provisioning, Job scheduling and Dropping:
After receiving results of the double auction (actual charges
and VM allocation αmsji (t), ∀s ∈ [1, S], ∀j ∈ [1, F ]), cloud
i schedules its jobs on its local servers and (potentially)
purchased VMs from other clouds, decides which jobs to drop
and the number of active servers to provision, by solving the
one-shot optimization in (16). Detailed steps can be found in
our technical report [13].
The derived number of type-s jobs scheduled to run on the
local servers is
μsii(t) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
C
ms
i
·N
ms
i
−
∑
j =i α
ms
ji
(t)
gs
if Q
s
i (t)+Z
s
i (t)
V ·gs
> βi(t)/C
ms
i
and s = s∗ms
0 Otherwise
,
(23)
and the number of type-s jobs to run at cloud j(= i) is
μsij(t) =
{
αmsij (t)/gs if s = s
∗
ms
0 Otherwise . (24)
The number of type-s jobs dropped by cloud i in t is
Dsi (t) =
{
D
s(max)
i if Q
s
i (t) + Z
s
i (t) > V · ξ
s
i
0 Otherwise
. (25)
The number of activated servers at cloud i to provision type-
m VM is calculated as
nmi (t) = (
∑
s∈[1,S],ms=m
μsii(t) · gs +
∑
j =i
αmji(t))/C
m
i . (26)
These many servers can provide enough type-m VMs for
serving local jobs and selling to other clouds.
Alg. 1 summarizes the dynamic algorithm at each cloud.
We next analyze the performance guarantee provided by our
dynamic algorithm. Due to space limit, all detailed proofs can
be found in [13].
Lemma 1: Let Qs(max)i = V ξsi +Rsi and Z
s(max)
i = V ξ
s
i +
s. If Ds(max)i ≥ max{Rsi , s}, each job queue Qsi (t) and
each virtual queue Zsi (t) are upper-bounded by Q
s(max)
i and
Z
s(max)
i , respectively, in t ∈ [0, T − 1], ∀i ∈ [1, F ], s ∈ [1, S].
Theorem 1 (SLA Guarantee): Each job of type s ∈ [1, S] is
either scheduled or dropped with Alg. 1 before its maximum
response delay ds, if we set s = Q
s(max)
i
+Z
s(max)
i
ds
.
Theorem 2 (Individual Proﬁt Optimality): Let Ω∗i be the
ofﬂine-optimal time-averaged proﬁt of cloud i ∈ [1, F ],
obtained with a truthful, individual-rational, ex-post budget-
balanced double auction, with complete information about its
own job arrivals and prices in the entire time span [0, T − 1].
The dynamic Algorithm 1 can achieve a time-averaged proﬁt
Ωi for cloud i within a constant gap Bi/V to Ω∗i , i.e.,
Ωi ≥ Ω
∗
i −Bi/V,
where V > 0 and Bi = 12
∑
s∈[1,S][[
∑F
j=1 C
ms
j N
ms
j /gs +
D
s(max)
i ]
2 + [Rsi ]
2 + [s]
2 + [D
s(max)
i +
∑F
j=1 C
ms
j N
ms
j /gs]
2] is
a constant.
The gap Bi/V can be close to zero by ﬁxing s and
increasing V . Detailed proof is included in [13].
V. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates proﬁt maximization strategies at
individual selﬁsh clouds in a cloud federation where VM
trading happens across cloud boundaries. We adopt a truthful,
individual-rational, ex-post budget-balanced double auction as
the inter-cloud trading mechanism, and design a dynamic
algorithm for each cloud to decide the best VM valuation and
bidding strategies, and to schedule job service/drop and server
provisioning in the most economic fashion, under time-varying
job arrivals and operational costs. The proposed algorithm can
obtain a time-averaged proﬁt for each cloud within a constant
gap from its ofﬂine maximum, based on solid theoretical
analysis.
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